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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
PENAL PROVISIONS OF THE NEW "HEART BALM"
LEGISLATION
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTIONS 61e AND 61g OF THE
NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
T HE recently enacted Article 2-A, of the New York Civil
Practice Act 1 passed by the New York Legislature in
March, 1935, purporting to abolish suits brought for the re-
covery of damages arising from breach of promise to marry,
alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction,
has been the subject of constitutional controversy in several
articles and a few cases considered by the courts since the
passage of the Act.a These discussions in the main have dealt
with the power, or lack of power, in the legislature to abolish
and prohibit all remedies for the enforcement of rights of ac-
tion well established and founded in the common law. Some
of these articles hold that these rights and liabilities are so
guarded under state and federal constitutions, that they can-
not be abolished by legislative enactment," while others hold
1 N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT (1935) §§ 61a to 61i, added by N. Y. Laws
1935, c. 263.
'a OHIO LAW REPORTER, April, 1935, reprinted in N. Y. L. J., April 5, 6,
1935, at 1732, 1756; (1935) 33 MICH. L. J. 979; (1935) 49 U. S. L. REV. 474;
(1936) 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 63; (1936) 5 BxcYN. L. REV. 196; cases infra
notes 2a to 2e.
'b Hibschman, Can "Legal Blackmail" Be Legally Outlawed? (1935) 49
U. S. L. REV. 474. After a brief inquiry into the nature and history of the
actions and remedies sought to be abolished the author discusses the cases
holding that all remedy cannot be abolished and distinguishes the employer's
liability and workmen's compensation cases on the basis that they left an
adequate remedy. He then concludes that "In the light of all these general
statements of principle and of the cases cited and discussed above, though one
cannot afford to be dogmatic, the conclusion seems inevitable that the legislative
power to deal with remedies does not extend to the complete abolition of
common-law rights and remedies. Statutory remedies may evidently be abro-
gated without the setting up of any substitutes, except where rights of action
have already accrued, or where they existed at the time of the adoption of a
state constitution and are deemed to be within the purview of its provisions
relative to remedies and due process of law. But common-law rights and
remedies are protected against total legislative extinction both by the Fourteenth
Amendment and by the due process and remedy for every injury clauses of the
respective state constitutions."
Myers, Validity of Statutes Prohibiting Breach of Promise and Alienation
Suits, OHIO LAW REPORTER, April, 1935. A direct and definite attack on the
constitutionality of this type of legislation, not considering the penal features,
but only the power of the legislature to deprive one of all remedy for a breach
of a duty recognized at common law. The author says: "The substantive law
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that no vested rights are impaired and that the legislature is
free to change or abolish any and all remedies for a wrong
to be committed in the futurelc
Few if any of these authorities have discussed the force
and validity of the penalties provided in the Act.2  In Haute-
feuille v. Miault 2a Judge Knox felt bound to recognize the
declared policy of the state as embodied in the statute and
granted defendant's motion to dismiss. In Wawrzim v.
Rosenberg 2b the court side-stepped the issue of constitution-
ality entirely by holding that the statute did not apply to a
cause of action brought in the federal court, the territorial
limits of which lay within New York, if the wrongful acts
of rights and duties concerning a particular subject canot be entirely destroyed
and abrogated by the legislature under the cloak of its police power, without
the body offering some adequate substitute in place of the rights destroyed-
as witness the cases under the various workmen's compensation acts, which
acts are police regulations of the state. The rights and duties may be increased
and enlarged from what they were at common law, but to destroy an existing
common-law right, or to take away all remedies for its enforcement, is to
violate the express provisions of both state and federal constitutions, so as to
leave those provisions devoid of meaning and without proper safeguard."1c Legis. (1936) 5 BKcLYN. L. REv. 196, in which the author welcomes the
new legislation as a recognition "at last accorded the practical ineffiacy of
theoretical expressions pervading the field of these actions." After a detailed
study of the defects existing in the abolished remedies the author concludes with
the question of constitutionality, pointing out that the authorities who question
the right of the legislature to bar these remedies base their arguments on the
right of a person to secure redress for a comnensable injury. But says the
author, "The damages secured by the actions for alienation of affections,
criminal conversation and breach of promise to marry do not fall into this cate-
gory. They are basically punitive damages. It seems scarcely questionable that
the legislature can abolish such damages. Secondly, the particular subjects encom-
passed with the statute make legislative cobtrol more necessary and desirable.
The state is a party peculiarly interested in the institution of marriage; so
much so, that public interests overshadow private rights. Interests of morality
and greater faith in our marriage institutions (which publicity of the success
of the above actions has done much to undermine) dictate the control exercised
in the present instance."
2 Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy (1936) 5 FoRDIAm L. REV. 66. does
not consider the constitutionality of the legislation at all, but attacks its wisdom
concluding that "High pressure of 'pell-mell' legislation, of doubtful constitu-
tionality, has not contributed much to the solution of economic problems, and
we suspect, will play little part on any constructive effort in the social order,
to determine the true balance between traditional legal concepts and modern
psychological and sociological theories."
Feinsinger, Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry.
Alienation of Affections. and Related Actions (1935) 33 MicH. L. REv. 979
and 10 Wis. L. REv. 417, does not consider the constitutionality of the statutes
but has a fine history and analysis of the nature of these causes of actions
tozether with a study of the provisions of the "Heart Balm" legislation in
different iurisdictions.
2a U. S. D. C., Nov. 9, 1935.2b 12 F. Supp. 548( E. D. N. Y. 1935).
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of the defendant were committed within New Jersey. In
Vanderbilt v. Hegerman 2c the only question presented to the
court was whether or not the sizxty-day period of limitations
set by the statute for the bringing of actions that had already
accrued was reasonable. The court held that it was in "view
of the purpose of the act and the presumption which pre-
vails as to its constitutionality." The court did, however, in-
timate very strongly that the question as to the constitution-
ality of the statute so far as it related to causes of action aris-
ing subsequent to its enactment was not without grave
doubt 2 d The question as to the validity of the penal provi-
sions was not raised nor did the court discuss it. And in
Hanfgarn v. Mark 2e Justice Faber held the statute uncon-
stitutional, as far as it applied to a suit for alienation of
affections, solely on the ground that the cause of action was
of common law origin and "like the rights of action for libel,
slander, assault and battery, negligence, or for recovery of
debt, are beyond the power of the legislature to abolish
utterly without supplying some reasonably adequate and
efficient substitute." Here for the first time the question of
the constitutionality of this statute was squarely put to the
court. And for the first time we find a case which comes
directly within the penal provisions of the Act, brought by
an attorney and his client with courage enough and with
strong enough convictions as to their respective rights to risk
the threat of imprisonment, fine and, in the case of the at-
torney, disbarment, in order to test a statute of doubtful
legality. The court in this case might well have discussed
the power of the legislature to declare the bringing of such
an action as this, unlawful and felonious, but the court, in
a simple and direct opinion, limited itself to the discussion
of the power of the legislature to abolish the remedy.
The penal provisions are found in Sections 61e and 61g.
Section 61e 3 reads as follows:
c N. Y. L. J., Jan. 18, 1936, at 317.
2d "The right to life and liberty includes more than mere freedom from
personal harm and actual physical restraint by the direct operation of enact-
ments of the Legislature. A person may be deprived of life and liberty by the
removal of those safeguards which restrain one individual from violating the
personal rights of others." Supra note 2c.
2e N. Y. L. 3., Feb. 29, 1936, at 1080.
1 N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE AcT (1935).
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"It shall hereafter be unlawful for any person,
either as a party or attorney, or an agent or other
person in behalf of either, to file or serve, cause to
be filed or served, or threaten to file or serve, or to
threaten to cause to be filed or served, any process or
pleading, in any court of the state, setting forth or
seeking to recover a sum of money upon any cause of
action abolished or barred by this article, whether
such cause of action arose within or without the state."
Section 61g 4 provides:
"Any person who shall violate any of the provi-
sions of this article shall be guilty of a felony which
shall be punishable by a fine of not less than one
thousand dollars, nor more than five thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment for a term of not less than one
year nor more than five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."
The legislature in all probability passed the above quoted
sections for a two-fold purpose. Editorials and comments in
newspapers and periodicals about the time of the passage
-of this Act were attacking these causes of actions as perfect
instruments for "legalized blackmail." r This opinion is re-
flected in Section 61a wherein the legislature declares the
public policy of the state.6 One reason and perhaps the pri-
'N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT (1935).
1Hibschman, Can "Legal Blackmail" Be Legally Outlawed? (1935) 49
U. S. L. REV. 474. "Reading the editorials and comments in current newspapers
and periodicals about the time of the adoption of these new laws, one would
conclude that there had seldom been an actual contract of engagement to marry
that was unjustifiably broken, causing damage to the offended party, or a
malicious intrusion on the theretofore harmonious relationship of a husband and
wife. The experience of practicing lawyers is decidedly otherwise." Kane,
Heart Balm and Public Policy (1936) 5 FORDHAm L. REV. 63, 66. " * * * there
are respectable opinions to the effect that undue newspaper publicity has caused
the public to ignore the private and public benefits of the actions discussed and
has given to isolated cases of abuse the appearance of universality." Feinsinger,
Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry, Alienation of
Affections, ad Related Actions (1935) 10 Wis. L. Rev. 417.
8 "The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of actions
based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and
breach of contract to marry, having been subjected to grave abuses, causing
extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many
persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the
1936 ]
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mary one was, therefore, to forestall any future efforts at
blackmail along these lines by unscrupulous persons who
might still find the threat of one of these causes of actions,
together with the attending publicity, embarrassment, humil-
iation and pecuniary damage, a helpful instrument for the
extraction of funds from their victims, even though the
cause of action itself had been abolished. The second and
more apparent purpose is to prevent a test of the constitu-
tionality of the new law.7
It is this second unexpressed but quite obvious purpose
that raises grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the
enactment, wholly apart from those doubts already expressed
on the subject. It is this purpose which raises the very im-
portant question "Are the requirements of due process and
equal protection of the laws met where the right of judicial
review of a legislative enactment is absolutely forbidden or
the enactment is made subject to review only on the condi-
tion that if the party who is contesting its validity is un-
successful he shall be subject to long imprisonment, heavy
fines, or both?"
An examination of the authorities will lead us to a
negative answer. Magna Carta, that great guaranty of free-
dom, which has become incorporated in the Bill of Rights
of our federal and state constitutions, provides, "We will
sell to no man, we will deny to no man, nor defer right or
justice." 8 Black in his handbook on American Constitu-
tional Law 9 speaking of this guaranty of free, prompt, and
effectual justice, says, "although it is but seldom violated
victims of circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by unscrupu-
lous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished
vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of crime and in many
cases having resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the
public policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the state will
be served by the abolition of such remedies. Consequently, in the public
interest, the necessity for the enactment of this article is hereby declared as a
matter of legislative determination."
" Kane, Heart Balin and Public Policy, supra note 5. "Section 61e provides
that it shall be unlawful for any person either as a party or attorney to start
or threaten to start any action seeking to recover a sum of money upon any
cause of action abolished by the new law, and Section 61g provides that any
person who violates any of the provisions of the law shall be guilty of a felony
punishable by fine or imprisonment. I shall not discuss the propriety of the
two latter sections. They seem to be almost unprecedented and their apparent
purpose is to prevent a test of the constitutionality of the new laws."
8 MAGNA CARTA art. 47.
9At 561, 2 (4th ed. 1927).
[ VOL. 10
HEART BALM LEGISLATION
by the legislature or the courts, it is one of the most impor-
tant and valuable principles of freedom. * * * It is violated
by a statute which forbids the maintenance of an action
against a trade union or an association of employers for a
tortious act committed by or on behalf of such union or asso-
ciation. In re Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 618, 98
N. E. 337. On the other hand this guaranty is violated by
a law which imposes heavy penalties or fines or other disas-
trous effects on the attempt to resist, by appeal to the courts,
the enforcement of a statute deemed unjust or invalid, the
effect being to deter persons concerned from asserting their
opposition to it in good faith and thus in effect, denying
them a remedy for their injuries." 10
The leading case on the subject is that of Ex parte
Young"Ll holding a railroad rate statute unconstitutional
which fixes penalties for disobedience of the orders of the
commission by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe
as to intimidate the corporations and their officers from re-
sorting to the courts to test the validity of the rates. The
court said: "If the law be such as to make the decision of
the legislature or of a commission conclusive as to the suffi-
ciency of the rates, this court has held such a law to be un-
constitutional. * * * A law which indirectly accomplishes
a like result by imposing such conditions upon the right to
appeal for judicial relief as work an abandonment of the
right, rather than face the conditions upon which it is offered
or may be obtained, is also unconstitutional. It may, there-
fore, be said that when the penalties for disobedience are
by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to in-
timidate the company and its officers from resorting to the
courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is
the same as if the law in terms prohibited the company from
seeking judicial construction of laws which deeply affect
its rights."
In Wadley Southern B. R. v. Georgia 12 the court held
"Citing Washington Southern Nay. Co. v. Baltimore and Phila. Steam
Boat Co., 263 U. S. 629, 44 Sup. Ct. 220 (1924) ; Florida East Coast R. R. v.
The State, 79 Fla. 66, 83 So. 708 (1920) ; Atlantic Coast Line v. Wilson and
Toomer Fertilizer Co., 89 Fla. 224, 104 So. 593 (1925); Bonnett v. Vallier,
136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885 (1908).
"209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441 (1908).
"235 U. S. 651, 35 Sup. Ct. 214 (1915).
1936 ]
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a statute under which heavy penalties were imposed upon a
railroad company for violation of orders of the railroad com-
mission, void under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, saying that the carrier could
avail itself of the right of access to the courts to test the
validity of the commission's orders only at the risk of hav-
ing to pay the penalties. The court, after pointing out that
the methods by which the "right of judicial review are se-
cured vary in different jurisdictions," said: "But, in what-
ever method enforced, the right to a judicial review must be
substantial, adequate and safely available; but that right
is merely nominal and illusory if the party to be affected
can appeal to the courts only at the risk of having to pay
penalties so great that it is better to yield to orders of un-
certain legality rather than to ask for the protection of the
law."y
The principle announced in the Young case was reaf-
firmed and approved in Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Tucker 13
which case is probably more in point for our present dis-
cussion as the appeal was not from the action of an admin-
istrative board but an appeal from an enactment of the
legislature. Here the court held that the imposition by
statute of the liability of $500 liquidated damages for every
charge by a common carrier in excess of the rates therein
fixed for the shipment of oil between points in the state,
took property without due process of law by heavily penal-
izing an unsuccessful appeal to the courts.
To the same effect and equally in point is State v. Craw-
ford 14 in which the court held that the imposition of a fine
of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both, for the violation of a statute forbidding
the exaction of more than five cents for one continuous ride
on a street car within any city or town was unconstitutional
as denying to the railroad companies due process of law and
the equal protection thereof because they could only have
a hearing upon the constitutionality of the statute at the
risk, if mistaken, of being subject to such heavy and ex-
cessive penalties as practically to foreclose to them the right
to litigate such question.
" 230 U. S. 340, 33 Sup. Ct. 961 (1913).
' 74 Wash. 248, 133 Pac. 590 (1913).
[ VOL. 10
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And in Bonnett v. Valier'5 with reference to a tene-
ment house act, the court said that the penalties involved in
the regulation were so severe as to effectively intimidate
property owners from resorting to the courts for redress or
defense as to their honestly supposed rights. The court held
these penalties highly unreasonable and of such a nature as
to render the act void, irrespective of whether its other pro-
visions would otherwise be valid. The court further said
that to penalize good-faith resistance to the enforcement of
a law by judicial interference is unreasonable and inde-
fensible from any point of view; that it denies the equal pro-
tection of the laws, violates the constitutional guaranty to
every person of a certain remedy in the law for all injuries
to person and property and violates every principle of civil
liberty.
From the above cases and others cited therein it is seen
that the aim of some legislatures to frame their enactments
with such cunning adroitness and to hedge them about with
such savage and drastic penalties as to make it impossible
to test the validity of such statutes in the courts, save at a
risk no prudent man would dare to assume, has met with
very little approbation from the courts.'0 An apt comment
-Supra note 10.
'In the case of DeWitt v. State, 108 Ohio St. 513, 141 N. E. 551 (1923),
the court upheld the constitutionality of a provision of that state's Workmen's
Compensation Act imposing heavy penalties in the case of an unsuccessful
review of the award of the compensation bureau. It is to be noted, however,
that five of the seven judges were of the opinion that the provision was uncon-
stitutional, but its constitutionality was upheld by reason of a provision in the
state constitution that a statute shall be upheld if more than one of the judges
are of the opinion that it is constitutional. One of the main reasons for uphold-
ing such penalizing provision, given by the two judges who were of the opinion
that it was constitutional, was that the entire section of which the penalizing
provision was a part had been upheld by a unanimous bench in the Supreme
Court of the state, in the case of Fassig v. State, 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N. E.
104 (1917) ; but as shown by the opinion of the majority in the DeWitt case,
the court in the Fassig case did not pass on the constitutionality of the penalizing
provisions, nor was it necessary for it to pass upon such a question, although the
counsel did raise the point in argument, in order to obtain the court's view
upon a mooted question. 39 A. L. R. 1181.
And in Rail and River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338, 35 Sup. Ct. 359
(1915), and in Portland R. Light and P. Co. v. Portland, 210 Fed. 667 (1914),
the constitutionality of penal provisions were upheld upon the ground that the
penalties were not so excessive or unreasonable as to come within the rule laid
down in the Young case.
And in Towhy Bros. v. Kennedy. 295 Fed. 462 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924), writ
of error dismissed without opinion for want of jurisdiction, 265 U. S. 575,
44 Sup. Ct. 636 (1924), a penal provision providing for the addition of 12%
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upon the character of this type of legislation is found in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer in Cutting v. Kansas City
Stock Yards Co. 17  At page 100 he stafes: "Do the laws
secure to an individual an equal protection when he is al-
lowed to come into court and make his claim or defense sub-
ject to the condition that upon failure to make good that
claim or defence the penalty for such failure either appro-
priates all his property or subjects him to extravagant or
unreasonable loss?" And again at page 102 he says: "It
is doubtless true that the state may impose penalties such
as will tend to compel obedience to its mandates by all in-
dividuals or corporations and if extreme and cumulative pen-
alties are imposed only after there has been a final deter-
mination to the validity of the statute the question would be
very different from that here presented. But when the legis-
lature, in an effort to prevent any inquiry of the validity of
a particular statute, so burdens any challenge thereof in the
courts, that the party affected is necessarily constrained to
submit rather than take the chances of the penalties im-
posed, then it becomes a serious question whether the party
is not deprived of the equal protection of the laws." 18
If courts are so ready to overthrow and declare invalid
legislative enactments which indirectly prohibit or penalize
appeals to judicial bodies for their interpretation, what hope
can be held out for the validity of Sections 61e and 61g of
the New York Civil Practice Act which so directly and un-
questionably forbid and penalize the prosecution of any of
interest to an employee's award under the Employer's Liability Act upon an
unsuccessful appeal by the employer, was held as not burdening the right to
appeal as to render the provision unconstitutional. But in Arizona Eastern
R. Co. v. Head, 26 Ariz. 259, 224 Pac. 1057 (1924), the state supreme court held
the same provision a violation of the 14th Amendment, and cited with disapproval
the preceding case.
And in State ex rel. Railroad Comm. v. Oregon R. and Nav. Co., 68 Wash.
160, 123 Pac. 3 (1912), the court held that there was no inhibition upon a state
to impose penalties for disregard of its police regulations and that the extent
of the penalties was a matter entirely within the control of the legislature. The
court did not suggest the effect of the penalty as discouraging appeals to the
courts and the following year in State v. Crawford, supra note 14, the same
court held that a heavy penalty for violation of a railroad rate statute was a
denial of due process and equal protection because it practically foreclosed the
right to litigate the question.
1 183 U. S. 79 22 Sup. Ct. 30 (1901).8 Although the question was not decided, as the case was decided on another




the causes of actions sought to be abolished? How else can
the constitutionality of Article 2-A be determined? The
courts will not answer abstract questions of law. A real
controversy must be presented. Therefore a person to whom
one of these causes of action accrues, if he wishes a judicial
determination of the right of the legislature to abolish his
remedy so long established and recognized in the common
law, must prosecute his action. And at what a risk! If the
court should find that the legislature has acted within its
constitutional limitations then he is liable to a fine not less
than $1,000 nor more than $5,000; or imprisonment for a
term not less than one year or more than five, or both, as a
common felon. But even if he be willing to take the risk
he must find an attorney who is willing to take the same
risk with him for not only is the interested party subject to
the penalties, but the attorney, whose sworn duty it is to
protect and guard his client's rights, may not seek judicial
interpretation of these rights if they fall within the for-
bidden class without subjecting himself to the same fine and
imprisonment which faces his client with the additional
threat of disbarment as a felon.
Is this due process of law? Is this equal protection of
the laws? Obviously, it is not. The court in Wifliams v.
Village of Portchester 19 speaking of. the rights guaranteed
by the constitution says: "In view of the great purposes of
government and the understanding of the framers of our
constitutional system, there can be no doubt that the intent
of the constitutional provisions above cited 20 was to guar-
anty to every member of the state free access to the courts
and of full opportunity to have judicial determination of all
controversies which might involve his rights where such
rights were the outgrowth of contracts or of violated duty.
The purpose sought to be accomplished was to afford pro-
tection to all rights of mankind and it is not material that
we should be able to say precisely what right is violated-
whether of life, liberty or property; but any encroachment
" 72 App. Div. 505, 76 N. Y. Supp. 631 (2d Dept. 1902).
' N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 1. "No member of the State shall be disfranchised
or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof,
unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers."
N. Y. CoxsT. art. I, § 6. "No person shall be *** deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law."
1936 ]
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upon the fundamental rights of the individual was to find a
certain remedy in the law." Surely the guaranties of due
process require that the acts of the legislature affecting the
rights of person or property shall be subject to a review by
the courts and to a judicial determination as to their valid-
ity. Black, speaking of the rights guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment, says: "And it is unlawful to prevent
or penalize the resistance of persons or corporations to laws
which they may deem injurious or oppressive, by visiting
them, or their attempt to do so; with such excessive and
ruinous penalties or such a multiplicity of prosecutions or
such danger of heavy fines or imprisonment as to intimidate
them or prevent them from seeking relief in the courts; this
amounts to denying the equal protection of the laws." 21
From a study of the cases it is apparent that although
the courts are almost unanimous in their condemnation of
legislative enactments which prohibit or penalize a judicial
review, they are not entirely in accord in selecting the exact
provision of the constitution which is violated. Some place
the violation under the due process clause, others under the
equal protection, and still others under both. The apparent
conflict, or better still, inconsistency of the courts, suggests
that there might still be another reason not found in the ex-
act terms or clauses of the constitutions. A search for such
a reason brings us quickly and unerringly to the doctrine
of "separation of powers."
This fundamental principle of American constitutional
jurisprudence, accepted both by the federal and state gov-
ernments, is defined by Willoughby as follows: 22 ,,* * * So
far as the requirements of efficient administration will per-
mit, the exercise of the executive, legislative, and judicial
powers are to be vested in separate and independent organs
of government." The value of this doctrine in protecting the
people from arbitrary and oppressive acts on the part of
those in power has never been questioned. And although
the Federal Constitution does not contain any specific dis-
BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1927)
567, 568.
13 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1929) 1616.
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tributing clause 23 it has never been doubted but that this
doctrine was intended and does govern our system of gov-
ernment. 24 The principle of separation of power is, of course,
not forced upon the states by the Federal Constitution.25
Practically all of the states have, however, adopted consti-
tutions with express distributing clauses or clauses similar
to that found in the Federal Constitution providing that
the executive power shall be in the executive officers, the
legislative power in the legislature, and the judicial power
in the courts. 26
The power of the courts to refuse to apply legislative
acts inconsistent with constitutional provisions, cannot, at
this late date be doubted. Courts are jealous of their power
and do not hesitate to protect it by declaring null and void
any legislative enactment that threatens to interfere with
their independence. In State v. Morrill 27 the Supreme Court
of Arkansas declared: "The legislature may regulate the
exercise of, but cannot abridge, the express or necessarily
implied powers granted to the courts by the constitution.
'Its equivalent, however, is found in the clauses which provide that "all
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States," that "the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America," and that "the judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."
Washington in his Farewell Address said: "The spirit of encroachment
tends to consolidate the powers of all governments in one, and thus to create,
whatever the form of government, a real despotism."
Madison wrote in the Federalist (No. 47): "The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few or many, whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
John Adams wrote (1 Works 186) : "It is by balancing one of these three
powers against the other two that the efforts in human nature toward tyranny
can alone be checked and restrained and any degree of freedom preserved."
Hamilton wrote in the Federalist (No. 48) : "I agree that there is no liberty
if the powers of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers."
And Webster said: "The separation of the departments so far as prac-
ticable, and the preservation of clear lines between them is the fundamental
idea in the creation of all our constitutions, and doubtless the continuance of
regulated liberty depends on maintaining these boundaries."
' Calder v. Bull, 3 DalU. 386 (U. S. 1798). Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67 (1908), in which the court said: "We shall
assume that when, as here, a State Constitution sees fit to unite legislative and
judicial powers in a single hand, there is nothing to hinder so far as the
Constitution of the United States is concerned."
N. Y. CoNST. art. III, § 1; art. IV, § 1; art. VI, § 1.
216 Ark. 384 (1855).
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If it could, it might encroach upon both the judicial and
executive departments, and draw to itself all the powers of
government; and thereby destroy that admirable system of
checks and balances to be found in the organic framework
of both the federal. and state institutions, and a favorite
theory in the government of the American People."
So in the cases where the legislature has imposed heavy
fines and penalties upon the right -to appeal to the courts
for judicial interpretation, the legislature is interfering not
only with the rights of the individual, but indirectly with
the power of the courts, and the courts have been quick to
declare such enactments unconstitutional, and although they
have based their judgment officially on the violation of some
specific clause of the constitution, this thought could'not be
far from the judicial mind. For instance in State ex rel.
Dushek v. Watland,28 a very well considered case, in which
the court correlated the cases on this subject, the court said:
"In passing it may be noted that the Constitution of this
state creates the same three co-ordinate departments of gov-
ernment, and makes the same distribution of governmental
powers among such departments as does the Federal Con-
stitution."
These courts have, however, only dealt with statutes
which indirectly and subtly interfered with their power.
Can there be any doubt then of the fate of the New York
statute in question and similar statutes adopted in other
states which directly and unquestionably forbid and make it
a crime to bring an action to test their constitutionality?
Surely such legislation encroaches upon the powers of the
judicial department. Surely such legislation tends to draw
within the legislative department all the powers of govern-
ment. Surely that type of legislation tends to destroy the
system of checks and balances found in our federal and state
constitutions.
If the legislature can abolish the remedies for breach of
promise to marry, alienation of affections, criminal conver-
sation and seduction, and make it a criminal offense to ask
for a judicial determination of its power to do so, what is
to stop it from adopting the same procedure as to other com-
-51 N. D. 710, 201 N. W. 680 (1924).
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mon law remedies both for injuries to person or property,
in fact any remedy that may be abused by unscrupulous
persons. For if the courts uphold the present action of the
legislature, it shall certainly be a simple and expedient mat-
ter to abolish a cause of action into which any abuses have
crept. Certainly this requires very little legislative ability
or ingenuity and it effectively abolishes the abuses, even if
in so doing it incidentally abolishes the honest and legitimate
claimant's right to recompense for an injury done to him.
Of course such action might be interpreted by some as a
confession on the part of the legislature of its inability to
cope with blackmail, perjury and fraud.
But, to return to our original thesis, if Sections 61e and
61g are declared unconstitutional, as we think they must,
another interesting question arises. If the courts find these
sections invalid will they declare the whole of Article 2-A
invalid or will such action have no effect on the remaining
provisions of the Act? The final determination of the ques-
tion depends, of course, upon judicial determination, for it
is the judiciary which must in final analysis interpret the
legislative intent to determine whether the Act may still be
enforced without the objectionable sections or whether the
legislative purpose shall be so frustrated as to make the
whole Act a nullity. It is interesting to note, however, that
the Act in question does contain the very popular and fash-
ionable "saving clause" so universally employed today to the
effect that if any part of the Act is declared unconstitutional
the remainder shall not be effected.2 a This in itself is strong
indication of the legislative intent.
But it is interesting to note that in the case of E pairte
Young 29 the court said: "We hold, therefore, that the pro-
visions of the acts relating to the enforcement of the rates,
either for freight or passengers, by imposing such enormous
fines and imprisonment as the result of an unsuccessful ef-
fort to test the validity of the laws themselves, are uncon-
stitutional on their face without regard to the insufficiency
of those rates.' And in Bonnett v. Vallier 30 the court said:
2a N. Y. C. P. A. § 61h.
9209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441 (1908).
'tSupra note 15.
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"* * * where a police regulation is sought to be made effec-
tive by danger of such punishment for violations thereof and
such burdens upon unsuccessful effort even to test its
validity as to intimidate parties affected thereby from re-
sorting to the courts in the matter, as to practically prohibit
them from seeking any judicial remedy for supposed wrongs
inflicted upon them, denies to them equal protection of the
laws and renders the whole act void irrespective of whether
its provisions would otherwise be valid." 3l
But it is far more interesting to re-read Section 61a,32
wherein the legislature has declared the public policy of the
state, and to note how many of the purposes of the legislature
would be frustrated by a judicial decision adverse to Sections
61e and 61g. The section declares that the causes of actions
in question have been subject to "grave abuses, causing ex-
treme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary
loss to many persons wholly innocent 33 and free of any
wrongdoing." If it is no longer illegal to bring a suit or to
threaten to bring a suit surely these persons shall be subject
to the same annoyance, embarrassment and humiliation, and
in many cases to pecuniary loss. The section further states
that these remedies have "been exercised by unscrupulous
persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies hav-
ing furnished vehicles for the commission or attempted com-
mission of crime and in many cases having resulted in the
perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the public
'The court quoted as its authority for this proposition Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441 (1908).
Supra note 6.
"Further considering the matter of extortion or blackmail, we may assume
from the declaration of policy contained in Section 61a of the New York
statute that the 'grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment,
humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of
any wrongdoing' occurred in cases of breach of promise where there was no
actual engagement, where the circumstances would not justify an inference of
an intention to marry, and where there was no seduction, or in the alienation
and criminal conversation cases, where there was no actual enticement or
misconduct of the erring spouse and the alleged paramour. Only in such cases
would the defendant be wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing. Many
practicing lawyers who have prosecuted and defended breach of. promise cases,
have known only one wholly innocent defendant, and that one was our dear old
plump, respectable friend, Mr. Pickwick, in the action brought against him by
the 'unimpeachable' Mrs. Bardell, and one must conclude that even he might
have been more circumspect." Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, supra
note 5.
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policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the
state will be served by the abolition of such remedies." But
if persons are still permitted to bring suit or to threaten to
bring suit the same vehicles for the commission of crime and
fraud could be just as easily found and employed by these
unscrupulous persons.
HAROLD V. DIXON.
